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How a Minimum Wage Can Improve Efficiency Even in Competitive Labor Markets: 
The Webbs and the Social Cost of Labor 
 
Abstract 
Neoclassical economists, using a competitive demand/supply model of labor markets, 
typically conclude a legislated minimum wage is harmful to economic efficiency and 
social welfare. The major theoretical counter-attack by proponents of a minimum wage is 
to argue that low-wage labor markets are better modeled as monopsonistic. This paper 
develops and formalizes a second theoretical defense for a legal minimum wage law. This 
defense rests on the concept of the social cost of labor, as originally popularized by 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb and then further developed by American institutional 
economists. This analysis is unique in that it continues to use the competitive 
demand/supply model but nonetheless demonstrates that a legislated minimum wage 
often simultaneously increases both economic efficiency and fairness, unlike the 
neoclassical prediction.  
 
1.  Introduction   
 
The founders of the London School of Economics (LSE), Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 
were among the first in the academic world to make the positive case for a legal 
minimum wage. The main line of the argument was set out in their monumental book 
Industrial Democracy (1897) and later amplified by Sidney Webb in his article “The 
Economic Theory of a Legal Minimum Wage” (1912) in the Journal of Political 
Economy. The case built by the Webbs for the minimum wage, as well as for related 
measures such as collective bargaining, became an intellectual foundation stone for early 
twentieth century progressive economists and social reformers on both sides of the 
Atlantic, particularly Commons and the American labor institutionalists (Kaufman, 2004; 
Thompson, 2007). Among the latter group was Leo Wolman who wrote in his memoirs, 
“The labor point of view [was] first and most effectively developed by the Webbs… and 
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there wasn‟t a man in the United States – or in the world – who taught this stuff… who 
didn‟t say this” (1961: 55).    
Debate on a legal minimum wage continues unabated more than a century since 
the Webb‟s wrote their book and since the first minimum wage laws were enacted in 
1896 in New Zealand and Australia. One would think that the Webbs would still be 
routinely cited in the modern literature on the minimum wage and that their theoretical 
case for a legal minimum wage would serve as a well-recognized reference point for 
delineating the “pro” side of the issue. Surprisingly (or not surprisingly), in the last three 
decades their names and point of view have almost completely dropped from sight in the 
mainstream economics literature, as has reference to practically any of the pro-minimum 
wage literature written by other labor progressives of that era. This “disappearing act” 
coincides closely with the rise to dominance in mainstream labor economics of the 
neoclassical paradigm, the Chicago School version of “economic imperialism,” and the 
widespread use of the perfectly competitive labor market model as the base-line theory 
for policy evaluation (Addison and Hirsch, 1997).   
 As demonstrated by Stigler (1946) in his equally classic article on the minimum 
wage, if one starts with a model of a competitive labor market it readily appears that a 
minimum wage is socially harmful and a bad idea (also see Mincer, 1976; Rottenberg, 
1981). If pegged above the market wage, a minimum wage law, according to this simple 
model, leads to fewer jobs, higher unemployment, higher prices for consumers, reduced 
profits for firms, lower wages in the uncovered sector, and – most critically -- a general 
misallocation of resources and loss of efficiency in the overall economy.  
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Interestingly, the Webbs (p. 655) started their positive case for a minimum wage 
by also using the Marshallian/Walrasian competitive model as their theoretical base line; 
the difference is that they then demonstrated using the social cost idea why this model 
gives a misleading and often incorrect prediction about the effects of a minimum wage 
law. This idea has retained a presence in national labor policy debates in Britain, Europe 
and Australasia in recent decades (e.g., Grimshaw, 2004; Buchanan, Watson, and 
Meagher, 2004; Craig, et. al. 1982; Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005), as well as in certain 
heterodox areas of economics (e.g., institutional economics, such as Prasch, 2005; 
feminist economics, such as Powers, 1999, and Figart, Mutari, and Powers, 2002; and 
neo-Marxist economics, such as Barrett and McIntosh, 1980) and among modern-day 
proponents of a “living wage” (Pollin and Luce, 1998; Figart, 2004; Levin-Waldman, 
2005). However, among mainstream labor economists, most prominently in the United 
States, one can scan the minimum wage (and living wage) literature and fail to find this 
argument anywhere presented.   
My twofold purpose in this paper is, first, to put the Webb‟s positive case for 
minimum wage legislation back on the table for renewed attention and debate and, 
second, to better formalize and develop the social cost idea in terms of standard economic 
analysis. Of chief interest, I demonstrate that the Webb‟s social cost rationale for a 
minimum wage leads to the prediction that even in a competitive labor market -- not just 
a monopsonistic labor market, as examined in Card and Krueger (1995) -- a minimum 
wage can increase economic efficiency, as well as fairness. That is, rather than harm the 
economy a minimum wage eliminates an often large and mostly hidden social tax on 
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labor and stops an equally large and hidden social subsidy for capital (“corporate 
welfare”) and consumers.    
 
2.  Labor‟s Inequality of Bargaining Power 
 
The Webbs‟ case for a minimum wage is built on two main pillars. The first is the 
doctrine of labor‟s inequality of bargaining power (IBP). Erected on top of this is the 
social cost of labor (SCL) doctrine. I briefly describe each, going in order.  
In the modern economics literature, the minimum wage debate has become 
framed as an issue regarding whether labor markets are best characterized as competitive 
or monopsonistic (Dolado, et. al. 1996; Neumark and Wascher, 2006; Metcalf, 2008). 
The competitive model predicts that a minimum wage destroys jobs and harms economic 
efficiency, while the traditional monopsony model predicts just the opposite – that is, a 
carefully positioned minimum wage can increase jobs and promote greater efficiency. 
This juxtaposition has led to a “battle of the models” in labor economics with the central 
issue in dispute being whether a minimum wage, or rise therein, does or does not lead to 
a decrease in employment (Card and Krueger, 1995; Manning, 2003). If the former, the 
evidence seems to favor the competitive model and the critics of a minimum wage, if the 
latter then the evidence seems to favor the monopsony model and the supporters of a 
minimum wage. Although opinions vary, my assessment is that the critics of a minimum 
wage occupy the scholarly high ground, partly because many economists instinctively 
doubt that most low-wage labor markets have a substantively important element of 
monopsony and partly because the large majority of published empirical studies find 
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evidence of a negative employment effect (Neumark and Wascher, 2006. But see 
Doucouliagos and Stanley, this issue).    
 The Webbs, the American institutionalists, and many classical and early 
neoclassical economists (e.g., Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall) believed that labor markets, 
particularly at the lower end, were dominated by employers (Kaufman, 1994). 
Monopsony per se was a real but only partial contributor, however. Also contributing 
were four other factors. The five together created what was universally known in the 
early twentieth century as the worker‟s “inequality of bargaining power” (Kaufman, 
1989). IBP indicates that employers individually and/or as a group enjoy a power 
advantage in wage determination, even in what modern neoclassical economists would 
consider a seemingly competitive labor market situation.  
The Webbs lay-out the case for labor‟s IBP in their classic chapter “The Higgling 
of the Market.” In addition to monopsony, IBP also arises, they claim, from the semi-
unique characteristics of labor as a tradable good.  Labor, observe the Webbs, is a 
perishable service that must be sold each day or forever lost, while most produced goods 
can be staggered or inventoried. The worker, as a generalization, is thus under more 
pressure to sell than the employer is to buy. Likewise, bargaining power depends on 
which party has the resources to hold out the longest in the negotiations. Here again the 
average low-skilled worker is under more pressure to reach a deal since he/she typically 
lives from paycheck to paycheck and has small savings or other income/assets, while the 
company has much deeper financial reserves and less immediate need to get the job 
filled. The greater the worker‟s needs and the thinner the fall-back resources, the more 
desperate the person becomes for work and the lower the reservation wage  -- explaining 
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in part the low pay and poor conditions of vulnerable groups such as unskilled single 
women with dependent children (Powers, 1999). The result of workers‟ fewer choices 
and resources is to shift the market labor supply curve to the right. The resulting labor 
market equilibrium is still nominally competitive, but the wage is lower than if the market 
were “truly” competitive” (equal bargaining power).  
A variety of market imperfections and frictions also create an IBP for the 
individual worker. Discrimination, for example, narrows job opportunities for women 
and minority workers and creates a condition of occupational crowding in the low-end of 
the labor market. Certainly in the Webbs‟ era, and perhaps today, employers also had the 
advantage in wage determination because they could more easily use collective action. 
Many low-wage workers had little chance of using collective bargaining to raise wages, 
while firms frequently combined to “manage” competition and local wage rates through 
local employment bureaus, personnel associations, and industry associations (Harris, 
2000). One can envision occupational crowding and the weakness of individual 
bargaining as again leading to a rightward shift of the labor supply curve.  
A fourth factor arises from pre-market laws and institutions that undercut the 
worker‟s bargaining power. The Webbs (pp. 677-88) and the American institutionalists 
(Commons, 1934) observed that the legal “rules of the game” are determined in a 
political process that employers and the rich dominate. Not unexpectedly, they fashion 
the rules of the labor market to promote their interests. Examples include the legal 
“employment-at-will” doctrine (allowing employers to terminate workers at any 
moment), lack of a social safety net for workers (e.g., no unemployment insurance 
program), and “open border” immigration laws that flood the labor market with job 
 8 
seekers. All of these factors weaken the worker‟s ability to bargain for a decent wage, in 
effect again shifting the supply curve rightward in a still seemingly competitive labor 
market. 
The fifth factor, probably the most serious, is the presence in most years of a 
“reserve army” of unemployed workers. The Webbs, along with John Hobson, Commons 
and other economic “heretics” (later to include Keynes), denied the validity of Say‟s Law 
and the Invisible Hand theorem of neoclassical economics; that is, the propositions that a 
market economy is self-regulating and has a built-in tendency to operate at full-
employment (Kates, 1998). Instead, they thought that a capitalist economy typically 
operates in a condition of excess labor supply (more job seekers than openings), 
particularly for the unskilled at the bottom end, and that wage reductions fail to solve the 
problem. This excess supply of labor in effect puts workers on the “long side” of the 
market and substantially undercuts their ability to bargain for decent wages and 
conditions. The Webbs (p. 660) state, for example, “When the unemployed are crowding 
round the factory gates every morning, it is plain to each man that, unless he can induce 
the foreman to select him rather than another, his chance of subsistence for weeks to 
come may be irretrievably lost. Under these circumstances bargaining, in the case of the 
individual isolated workmen, becomes absolutely impossible.” Given a chronic shortage 
of jobs, workers are forced to yet again lower their reservation wage, which one might 
picture as another rightward shift of the labor supply curve in a low-wage labor market.  
The net outcome of these five developments is to place the individual worker, 
unaided by a trade union or government law, on a playing field that is seriously tipped in 
favor of employers. The bottom-end labor market is in many situations highly 
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competitive – indeed, it is competitive in the classic “dog-eat-dog” way – and workers 
have no choice but to accept very low wages and unattractive terms and conditions of 
employment if they are to get and keep a job. Compensating-type wage differentials for 
job risks and disamenities, if they exist at all, are typically minimal.  
The party who seems to most directly benefit from the extra-low wage in labor 
markets is employers. But employers, note the Webbs, are in many respects the agent of 
consumers and it is the consumers – particularly affluent consumers who have the 
disproportionate share of income to spend -- who also benefit from low wage labor in the 
form of lower prices for purchased goods and services. Consumers sit atop what the 
Webbs call “the chain of bargains” and have many alternative sources of supply, while 
manual unskilled workers are at the bottom of the chain and face the alternative of work 
or starve. In this regard, the Webbs observe, “the impulse for cheapness, of which the 
consumer is the unconscious source, grows in strength as it is transmitted from one stage 
of bargaining to another, until at last, with all of its accumulated weight, it settles like an 
incubus on the isolated workman‟s means of subsistence” (p. 674). The Webbs and 
American institutionalists backed up this grim conclusion with empirical studies of wages 
and family budgets that demonstrated many manual workers and their families in this 
period lived below the subsistence level (Booth, 1902; Lauck and Sydenstricker, 1917). 
 From a neoclassical perspective, where labor is viewed as a commodity like 
wheat or oil and pre-market institutions and rules of the game are typically taken as 
datum, a very low market wage is the necessary outcome of demand and supply and is 
prima facie socially beneficial since it reflects the large factor supply and low 
opportunity cost of labor, thus promoting an efficient allocation of resources and 
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production of goods and services. If there remains an excess supply of labor, the solution 
is to lower wages further until a demand/supply equilibrium is reached. The Webbs and 
other progressive/heterodox economists (e.g., Perlman, 1928), concluded, on the other 
hand, that the orthodox perspective guaranteed sweatshop jobs and poverty for a large 
part of the workforce and considerable labor unrest and enthusiasm for socialism.  
One social rationale for a legal minimum wage, therefore, is that it offsets the 
worker‟s weak bargaining power in the labor market. The penchant of neoclassical 
economists is to say “assume a competitive labor market,” draw a demand/supply 
diagram, determine the market wage, and then demonstrate that a minimum wage floor 
set at the market level leads to all the pernicious effects earlier cited. The Webbs and the 
American institutionalists insisted, however, that economists not simply take the wage 
outcome of the labor market as a mechanical working out of natural forces but instead 
look at the human-made factors that determine the position of the demand and supply 
curves and, therefore, whether the wage is high or low. In the case of the early twentieth 
century, the five factors enumerated above caused it to be quite low for a large part of the 
workforce. They also insisted that economists more carefully examine whose interests are 
promoted and harmed by competitive, unregulated labor markets, and maintained that the 
benefits flow disproportionately to firms, consumers, and the affluent and the costs 
disproportionately go to lower-income workers and other property-less groups.  
The Webbs and institutionalists concluded, therefore, that labor‟s IBP – 
manifested in sweated labor -- creates a social rationale on efficiency and fairness 
grounds for state abridgement of freedom of contract in labor markets. The efficiency 
rationale rests on the proposition that part of labor‟s IBP and low wage stems from legal 
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rules, social norms and market failures that, on balance, favor employers and consumers. 
A minimum wage, therefore, does not distort a pre-existing balanced and competitive 
labor market but, rather, helps restore balance and competitive outcomes to low-end labor 
markets otherwise tilted against the interests of workers. The fairness rationale, in turn, 
rests firstly on the legal principle that no party should be bound to honor contract terms 
agreed to under duress (e.g., either work under onerous conditions or face unemployment 
and destitution) and, secondly, the behavioral principle that workers at some point refuse 
to constructively participate in an employment relationship when they perceive norms of 
distributive justice are seriously breached (Miller, 1991; Trebilcock, 1993).   
Since the totality of the labor market situation prevents individual workers from 
bargaining on a more-or-less equal plane with the employer, with resulting losses in 
efficiency and fairness, a public policy rationale opens up for state regulation of labor 
markets in order to protect low-wage workers. One way the state can do this is minimum 
wage legislation. In this spirit, Commons observes: “If they [workers] are to be helped 
toward an equality of bargaining power, the state must take the initiative. This it does by 
setting standards below which wages may not be depressed – in other words, by passing 
minimum wage legislation” (Commons and Andrews, 1936: 43). 
 
4.  The Social Cost of Labor 
 
The IBP rationale for a minimum wage leads to and complements the social cost of labor 
rationale. The latter is in certain ways the more fundamental challenge to the neoclassical 
critique of a legal minimum wage. It also is a centerpiece argument in the recent rebirth 
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of cross-country movements to move beyond a minimum wage to a “living wage” 
(Figart, 2004). The two concepts are closely related, but as generally defined both at the 
time of the Webbs and now a minimum wage connotes a social subsistence level of 
earnings while a living wage connotes a somewhat higher level that provides a minimally 
adequate standard of living (Glickman, 1997; Ciscel, 2004).    
 The SCL idea starts from the thoroughly orthodox and non-controversial 
proposition that economic efficiency requires that the price of consumption goods 
incorporates the full cost of the factor inputs used in producing these goods. If such is not 
the case, private cost is less than social cost, product prices are too low, and output is too 
high (Pigou, 1920). This problem is typically treated in neoclassical theory as a negative 
externality arising from, in Coase‟s words (quoted in Stabile, 1993a: 179), an “absence of 
defined property rights.”  
 The innovation of the Webbs and the American institutionalists was to apply the 
negative externality (missing property rights) concept to the employment relationship in 
order to develop a positive rationale for legal minimum wages and collective bargaining 
(Blum, 1956; Kapp, 1971; Stabile 1993a,b; Prasch, 2005). To start, they note that labor 
(human capital), like physical capital, requires some minimum ongoing expenditure for 
upkeep, repair and depreciation if the input is to be maintained for current production and 
replaced for future production. Some of these minimum maintenance and depreciation 
costs are variable with respect to hours worked but the bulk are more of a fixed or 
“overhead” cost (e.g., a cost that does not vary proportionately with output); likewise, 
some apply only to the individual worker while others extend to dependents and families. 
Among these labor upkeep and replacement costs, for example, are minimum necessary 
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expenditures for food, shelter, clothes, health care and old-age support for the worker, as 
well as minimum support for non-working spouses and children if the workforce is to 
reproduce itself (the concept of a “family wage”).   
The idea of a subsistence wage was a central concept in classical (and Marxist) 
economics, per the observation of Adam Smith (1937: 67) that “A man must always live 
by his work, and his wages must be at least sufficient to maintain him.” The key insight is 
that if product prices are to cover the full social costs of production then firms must pay 
the worker a wage sufficient to cover the individual and family subsistence costs or, 
alternatively, provide in-kind compensation, such as company provided health care. If, on 
the other hand, the wage falls short of the subsistence level then the private cost of labor 
borne by the firm and its customers falls short of the full social cost. In this case either 
someone else bears this expense or, socially viewed, the nation‟s stock of human capital 
starts to depreciate and wear-out.  
Sidney Webb (1912: 986, 987) describes the situation in these words: 
 “The continued efficiency of a nation‟s industry obviously depends on the  
 continuance of its citizens in health and strength. For an industry to be self 
 -supporting, it must, therefore, maintain its full establishment of workers  
 unimpaired in numbers and vigor, [and] with a sufficient number of children to 
 fill all vacancies caused by death or superannuation. If the employers in a  
 particular trade are able to take such advantage of the necessities of their  
 workpeople as to hire them for wages actually insufficient to provide enough 
 food, clothing, and shelter to maintain them permanently in average health; if they 
 are able to work them for hours so long as to deprive them of adequate rest and 
 recreation; or if the can subject them to conditions so dangerous or insanitary as 
 positively to shorten their lives, that trade is clearly obtaining a supply of labor 
 force which it does not pay for... he [the employer] is clearly receiving a subsidy 
 or bounty …[and is] economically parasitic.” 
 
Webb‟s idea translates into modern employment conditions if we think about 
health care and retirement income support, say for fast-food workers. Each worker 
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requires some minimum necessary level of health care to cover physical/mental wear and 
tear, just as each machine requires ongoing maintenance and repair. Similarly, part of 
production cost is mothballing and replacing worn-out plant and equipment and what is 
true for physical capital is equally true for the firm‟s human capital (or “human 
machines”). Thus, fast-food product prices to consumers should for efficiency reasons 
cover these types of labor cost. In the case of health care, this may take the form of direct 
employer payments for health care, payment of a wage high enough to purchase the 
health care, or tax payments to finance a government health plan; similar options apply to 
retirement support. If the firms‟ prices do not cover these costs, consumers of fast-food 
benefit from subsidized prices, fast-food firms benefit from subsidized labor costs, while 
fast-food workers – or families, communities, and other third parties -- are in effect asked 
to contribute a labor tax to support and maintain the workforce. In these examples, fast-
food consumers and firms are, in the Webb‟s memorable phrase, parasitic in that they 
benefit from living off the resources of others.    
Having developed the social cost idea, the Webbs and institutionalists needed to 
first present a theoretical explanation for why the actual wage may well fall below the 
subsistence wage – also called the “social wage” -- and then follow this with  an 
explanation of why a legislated minimum wage can help solve this problem. They 
developed a two-pronged theoretical argument.  
The first prong was to invoke the concept of labor‟s IBP and then note that labor 
is embodied in real life human beings. That is, for the five reasons cited above the 
competitive forces of supply and demand in low-wage labor markets -- in the absence of 
trade unions, protective labor law, social insurance programs, macroeconomic 
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stabilization policies, and other such institutional interventions -- are likely to lead to 
wages insufficient to cover the full cost of the labor input. Such as situation for, say, coal 
or steel inputs may be easily and efficiently corrected by automatic market adjustments; 
for the labor input, however, the adjustment process turns into a human life-or-death and 
“survival of the fittest” problem that takes place with great difficulty, suffering, and 
possible social and political upheaval. Here is why. 
When the price does not cover firms‟ minimum average cost of producing coal, 
the suppliers do not generate enough revenue to cover production cost. Absent a short-run 
increase in demand, some firms are eventually forced to exist the industry; in effect, these 
firms die. After enough firms die, the supply curve of coal shifts leftward and eventually 
the market price rises enough to just cover minimum average cost (yielding normal or 
“subsistence” profit). A new equilibrium is reached without market regulation and price 
covers all production cost.  
Now repeat this exercise but substitute labor for coal. Due to IBP, the market 
wage does not cover the minimum social cost of labor. One option is to do nothing and 
let shifts in labor demand gradually raise the market wage, but this may take many years 
or supply may grow faster than demand.  Hence, in the short-run workers do not generate 
enough income to cover life needs. One possible response is that family members enter 
the work force (the “added-worker” effect) and further expand labor supply, driving the 
wage even lower. Eventually, some-to-many of these workers are forced (or “incented”) 
by the very low wages to exit the labor market. In neoclassical models, they voluntarily 
exit to consume more leisure (e.g., Lucas and Rapping, 1969), but where they get the 
income to support themselves is left unexplained. In real life, workers without adequate 
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labor earnings perforce drift into a life of begging, crime, drug addiction, or work in the 
underground economy (e.g., prostitution), typically leading to hastened physical/mental 
deterioration and possible early death for themselves and/or family members (future 
workers). After enough workers “go out of business,” the labor supply curve shifts 
leftward sufficiently to raise the market wage to just cover the minimum social cost. As 
viewed in mainstream economics, the labor market, like other competitive markets, 
eventually self-corrects a demand/supply imbalance and, in the process, brings the wage 
to a level where it covers the social cost of labor. No regulation needed!   
This type of neoclassical story, from an institutional perspective, is fatally flawed 
as a theory and a disaster-waiting-to-happen from a policy perspective. At a theory level, 
aggregate labor markets do not self-correct through wage deflation, as falling wages 
decrease purchasing power, further restrict product and labor demand, and thus intensify 
the demand/supply imbalance and pressures for further deflation. Keynes (1936) 
explained this in terms of economic theory; the Great Depression demonstrated this truth 
in real life. Thus, efficient use of the nation‟s resources is not improved but harmed by 
allowing competitive forces to solve a social cost gap. From a policy perspective, it might 
be an efficient use of resources to let some coal or steel firms go bankrupt in order to cure 
an over-supply and “lack of profit” problem, but it would surely be neither efficient nor 
humane to try to raise wages by eliminating part of the nation‟s workforce. Yet, absent 
institutional regulation and stabilization of labor markets, the only way the labor market 
can raise the wage enough to cover the social cost of labor is to eliminate part of the 
supply.  
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Is there a better way? Although heretical from a mainstream perspective, the 
Webbs and early institutional economists – along with Keynes and modern post-
Keynesians (e.g., Lavoie, 2006), believe that a legislated minimum wage can contribute 
to a solution of the social cost problem with far greater efficiency and fairness than can 
competition and laissez-faire. The idea is to use the minimum wage to set a wage floor in 
the labor market that approximates the social cost of labor. In this manner, all workers 
(and dependents) are guaranteed closer to a survival level of earnings from work. If 
setting the minimum wage involves some initial job loss, the Webbs and early 
institutionalists view this as a problem society must proactively address, be it through 
income maintenance, social insurance, job training, or other assistance-type programs. 
From an efficiency point of view, the minimum wage allows unfettered competition in 
labor markets as long as earnings are above the social wage level, while it also promotes 
efficiency by helping to stabilize purchasing power and aggregate demand in business 
cycle downturns. From a fairness perspective, it seems more humane to try to provide 
workers with a social wage through a legislated wage floor rather than waiting for either 
labor demand to slowly lift wages over the long-run or labor supply to do the same 
through reductions in the workforce.   
The second prong of the institutionalist‟s theoretical analysis of labor‟s social cost 
problem focuses on property rights and, in particular, incomplete property rights in labor. 
As Coase notes (cited above), a negative externality arises from poorly or incompletely 
specified property rights. That is, for a competitive market to yield efficiency every 
margin of a good must be priced, which requires that property rights to the good be 
perfectly partitioned (divisible) and delivered to the seller via a complete contract. 
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However, in labor markets the employment contract is notoriously open and incomplete, 
thus opening the door to an externality and social cost problem. The argument is hinted at 
by the Webbs (e.g., pp. 658, 661), was modestly more developed by Commons in Legal 
Foundations of Capitalism (1924), but found its fullest exposition in Studies in the 
Economics of Overhead Costs (1923) by neo-institutional economist J.M. Clark. Clark 
demonstrated that the social cost problem is an inherent feature of a capitalist 
employment relationship.  
Clark compares the position of the worker (labor) and machine (capital). He, like 
the Webbs, notes that capital and labor both require on-going expenditures for 
maintenance, repair and depreciation. What Clark then develops in detail, however, is the 
argument that the unfunded social costs of labor arise from differences in firms‟ 
ownership rights in the factor inputs capital and labor. In particular, Clark argues that 
firms are likely to cover the full cost of capital but not labor because they  
typically own capital but rent labor (since slavery is illegal). When agents own a 
resource, they have an incentive and responsibility to pay both the fixed and variable 
costs lest the resource be repossessed, become inoperable, or third parties (e.g., the 
government) assess fines and penalties for improper maintenance and disposal. When, on 
the other hand, agents rent a resource their only explicit cost is a variable charge per time 
period and they do not care if this payment is sufficient to cover the full costs of 
purchase, maintenance and depreciation.  
In a perfect market equilibrium, competition ensures that the cost of ownership 
and cost of rental are equivalent, so in this case all costs are equally and fully covered. In 
theory and fact, however, labor markets are always and everywhere imperfect, thus 
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opening the door for employers to shift part of the variable and fixed costs of labor. As I 
have argued elsewhere (Kaufman, 2007, 2008, building on Commons (1934) and Coase 
(1937), on the plane of pure theory a labor market and employment relationship can only 
exist if there are positive transaction costs for buying and selling labor services. The 
reason is that with zero transaction costs firms vertically disintegrate until they are sole 
proprietorships, eliminating the need to hire employees in a labor market; only with 
positive transaction cost do firms find employees to be a cost effective way to obtain 
labor services.  
Positive transaction cost (TC) arises from a number of factors, such as imperfect 
information, bounded human rationality, and imperfectly divisible property rights. These 
conditions cause employment contracts, in turn, to be incomplete. One consequence is 
that firms can shift some of the variable costs of labor to third parties. They do this by 
various stratagems, such as skimping on work conditions, reneging on pensions, and 
firing injured workers. Illustratively, one employer in the days before workmen‟s 
compensation remarked, “fingers cost me nothing” (Becker, 1906: 664); alternatively, 
Sidney Webb (1912) noted that the street railways took better care of their horses then the 
employees. In modern terms, these types of cost shifting arise from opportunism, moral 
hazard and asymmetric information – all made possible by poorly specified property 
rights in incomplete employment contracts. Regardless of the particular reason, 
consumers and firms are no longer paying the full social cost of labor.  
Because of poorly specified property rights, firms may also shift part of the fixed 
cost of labor to third parties. The problem here is that an overhead cost, by its nature, 
entails an indivisibility and cannot be fully or accurately apportioned among individual 
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users; further, the individual users have an incentive to dodge their share of the costs and 
pass them on to others. In the words of Clark, “[T]he overhead cost of labor is a 
collective burden upon industry in general, but the market does not allocate to each 
employer the share for which his own enterprise is responsible” (p. 372).   
The problem this indivisibility causes in labor markets is very similar to the 
“tragedy of the commons” that occurs in land markets (Cornes and Sandler, 1986). If a 
parcel of land is a common resource, individual farmers let their herds over-graze it, 
causing the land to deteriorate and lose its productivity. Now consider labor. Society is 
endowed with a resource called an industrial workforce that individual firms selectively 
utilize but do not own. They utilize it when it profits them to do so and contribute some 
share of the variable and fixed cost, but in other periods when they do not need the labor 
they discharge it and let the people who own it – the individual workers, as well as their 
families, the community, and society at large – cover the cost. From an economic point of 
view this overhead cost is a part of total production cost, yet firms are able to shift it – 
and have an incentive to because they only rent the labor. Note, on the other hand, how 
different the situation is for the capital they own. While unneeded workers are discharged 
with no further financial support, firms ordinarily continue to spend money on the upkeep 
of their factories and machines, even if the capital is currently idle and producing nothing 
(as in a recession). If needed again in the future, then the firms recall the labor and put the 
machines back into use, but evidently private production cost is less than social 
production cost since firms have paid only for the ongoing maintenance cost of capital 
but not of labor.  
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The end result is that firms and consumers are “parasitic,” just as the Webbs 
claim, and in effect survive and grow on a social subsidy at the expense of labor. What is 
the solution? Following Coase, if the problem arises from poorly specified property 
rights, then one course of action is to change the property rights to promote a more 
efficient (and equitable) outcome. An obvious solution is to give firms the same 
ownership right in labor that they have in capital. Slavery, however, is illegal (not to 
mention ethically unjust), so another option must be found. The solution Commons 
(1893) proposed a century ago is to create a new property right through legislation. This 
right states that every person be guaranteed a “right to work,” either in the form of a 
paying job or the minimum income there from. At the time he was denounced as a radical 
and proto-Socialist (Kaufman, 2003). In the contemporary U.S., Commons‟ “right to 
work” idea continues to have a radical tinge; in many European countries, on the other 
hand, the social wage idea gained considerable acceptance after World War II (Boyer, 
1993), albeit with some loss of support in recent years due the challenge of neo-
liberalism, global competitive pressures, and a paring back of the welfare state (Standing, 
2005). If direct provision of a social wage is not politically feasible or only partially 
accomplished, then alternatives must be found. One such alternative, even if distinctly 
second-best, is a legislated minimum wage. Although it does not guarantee workers an 
annual income that covers all social costs, it at least can go some way toward that 
objective.   
 
5. Diagrammatic Representation 
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It is helpful to put these arguments in diagrammatic form. Doing so illustrates how the 
Webbs and institutional labor economists turn the neoclassical indictment of minimum 
wage legislation on its head.  
Figure 1 depicts the low-wage labor market. When neoclassical economists 
analyze the minimum wage, they draw a diagram with the demand and supply lines, D1 
and S1, and label W1 the “competitive” wage. But in this exercise they omit from the 
diagram one crucial consideration: the social wage that covers the full cost of the labor 
input. For purposes of illustration, assume the social wage is W2. In actual fact, the social 
wage may be above, equal to, or below the prevailing market wage and determining such 
is ultimately an empirical issue. 
 
 
We may call the market wage W1 a pseudo competitive wage – pseudo because, 
first, it is an illusion obtained only by omitting consideration of the full social cost of 
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labor and the extra-market sources of labor‟s IBP; second, because it purports to yield an 
efficient resource allocation when in fact it yields an inefficient allocation (as with any 
externality). A market-determined wage at or above W2, may be called a true (or “full”) 
competitive wage since it covers all labor costs and yields economic efficiency. In Figure 
1, the difference W2-W1 represents the per unit social tax on labor and “social subsidy” to 
capital and consumers.  
Given this market failure, Coase (1960: 18) argues, “the problem is one of 
choosing the appropriate social arrangements for dealing with harmful effects.” Most 
clearly, a government mandated minimum wage is one such social arrangement. The idea 
is to set the minimum wage at the level of the social wage W2, thus creating a wage floor 
that covers labor‟s minimum fixed and variable cost (pro-rated on an hourly basis). This 
wage floor is depicted in Figure 1 by the solid horizontal line at W2.  
Now consider the effect of the minimum wage on employment and 
unemployment. It is possible, as Card and Krueger‟s (1995) study found and 
Doucouliagos and Stanley (this issue) confirm in their meta-analysis, that a minimum 
wage has on average a close-to-zero employment effect. Assume for purpose of debate, 
however, that the neoclassical theory is correct and the imposition of a minimum wage 
causes an employment decline, say from L1 to L2 in Figure 1. This loss of jobs is at the 
heart of the neoclassical critique of a minimum wage, but by the welfare standards of 
orthodox economics it should be welcomed rather than deplored. 
The reason is that the minimum wage reduces or eliminates the externality-like 
gap between the private and social cost of labor and thus improves economic efficiency. 
The effect is analogous to placing a tax on a paper mill that dumps pollution in a river. 
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That is, the higher cost causes the firm to reduce production and cut employment, but 
economic welfare is improved – not hurt -- because the tax corrects a market failure (a 
missing property right) that allows the firm to use a valuable social resource (the river) 
without paying the cost. A minimum wage is also, in effect, a tax on firms, but these 
firms -- like the paper mill -- are utilizing a resource to make profit without paying the 
full social cost. The minimum wage, therefore, has exactly the desired effect: it ends (or 
reduces) the subsidy on low-wage labor and causes firms to cut back on production and 
employment to the efficient level that would prevail if the labor market were truly 
competitive (e.g., W2, L2). Society gains from this loss of jobs because the human capital 
can be transferred to alternative uses that yield a higher return.  
 Other indirect benefits also arise. The loss of jobs from a minimum wage (if such 
occurs) forces society to confront and solve a problem it otherwise prefers to ignore: that 
is, why do L1-L2 workers have such low productivity that they cannot earn at least a 
subsistence wage? Likewise, not only do some workers potentially lose their jobs, some 
firms also go out of business. But again this result has to be regarded as in the social 
interest since it weeds out the least efficient and most backward firms and concentrates 
capital and managerial talent in the most efficient and advanced firms. In this regard, the 
Webbs observe: “[T]he Common Rule has another, and even more important result on the 
efficiency of industry, in that it is always tending to drive business into those 
establishments which are most favorably situated, best equipped, and managed with the 
greatest ability, and to eliminate the incompetent and old-fashioned employer” (1897, pp. 
727-28).  Further, the Webbs also note that the wage floor usefully serves to shift firms‟ 
search for competitive advantage from additional cheapening of already low-priced labor 
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to other methods, such as technological advance, higher product quality, and improved 
business methods.  
Critics may nonetheless assert it is socially misguided to destroy these L1-L2 jobs 
when they are held by low-wage workers who presumably need them and, further, 
voluntarily accepted them. Dwelling on this last point another moment, critics will often 
ask: how can the government in good conscience prevent workers and employers from 
freely negotiating employment contracts when it is self-evident that both sides gain from 
the exchange? The answer is given by taking the question in reverse direction. That is, if 
providing jobs to the poor is the overriding consideration, then why stop at abolishing the 
minimum wage? Why not also abolish every other protective labor law, including the ban 
on child labor? Doing so would get rid of additional “burdensome,” “inflexible,” and 
“inflationary” labor regulations, thus reducing the price of labor and inducing firms to 
hire more people. All sides gain from trade, so is not welfare increased? The answer is 
no: on efficiency grounds these outcomes are harmful to both workers and society if the 
market wage is less than the social wage, while on normative grounds they represent a 
retrogression to inhumane labor conditions that advanced societies have long ago 
repudiated.      
The unemployment effect of a minimum wage also deserves attention. Critics 
note that a minimum wage not only reduces employment but most likely increases 
unemployment in the market. Is this not also a harmful and perverse outcome? Perhaps, 
but it may also be beneficial and constructive. If the minimum wage is W2 in Figure 1, 
unemployment is L3-L2. The portion represented by lay-offs and reduced hiring is L2-L1. 
For reasons just cited, this portion of the “new unemployed” are being inefficiently 
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utilized and the disappearance of their jobs, although unfortunate, allows them to shift to 
more productive employments (or requires society to adopt other policy measures to 
create such). The L3-L1 portion represents new labor force entrants, induced to search for 
work by the higher wage. This may be judged a social virtue on two counts. Some of 
these new entrants are presumably substituting toward market work and away from 
underground/illegal work; also, encouraging people to seek gainful employment is often 
espoused as a desirable social value which is exactly what a minimum wage does.  
Several observations and caveats are necessary. First, an observation. 
I noted at the beginning of this article that the contemporary debate in Anglo-
American countries about the pros and cons of minimum wage legislation revolve around 
two central issues: the competitive versus monopsonistic nature of low-wage labor 
markets and, second, whether the employment effect is negative or zero/positive. We can 
now see that this way of framing the debate is far too narrow and slanted toward negative 
conclusions. The positive case for a legal minimum wage developed by the Webbs and 
early American institutionalists is far broader than an offset to monopsony, suggesting 
that to frame the debate in this manner is to seriously truncate the affirmative side. 
Likewise, critics condemn a minimum wage because it (allegedly) leads to a negative 
employment effect, yet as just demonstrated this loss of jobs and output may be a boon to 
economic efficiency and welfare rather than a detriment.  
Next two caveats. A minimum wage may solve the social cost problem, but as 
Coase (1960) observed there are also numerous alternative ways to accomplish the same 
end and, possibly, one or more may be superior.  
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For example, one approach is to eliminate the gap between the market wage and 
social wage through government programs that cover the overhead costs of labor, such as 
universal health insurance and old age pensions. Alternatively, the same could 
conceivably be accomplished through universal collective bargaining. In effect, 
government or union provision lowers the wage from work that is necessary to cover 
labor‟s social overhead costs, which in Figure 1 is equivalent to lowering the social wage 
from W2 to W1 (thus eliminating the social cost gap). A second approach is to shift the 
labor demand curve to the right through some type of wage or job subsidy to employers 
until it intersects the wage floor on the supply curve S1. The virtue of this approach is it 
closes the social cost gap and increases employment (Macpherson, 2004). Yet a third is 
an income supplement for low-wage workers, perhaps along the lines of the Working 
Families Tax Credit (WFTC) in the U.K. and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the 
U.S.  (Neumark and Wascher, 2007). The effects of these programs on the labor market 
vary; a simple but suggestive graphical representation is to observe that the addition of 
sufficient extra income can close the social cost gap through two channels. The first is to 
shift the labor supply curve leftward along D1 (because extra income, by creating a larger 
demand for leisure, raises the workers‟ reservation wage), thus raising the market wage; 
the second is to give workers greater income so they can better cover their overhead 
costs, which like government or union provision lowers the value of the social wage 
needed from work.  
A complete and rounded-out analysis of the minimum wage, therefore, requires a 
comparative institutional analysis of the pros and cons of alternative policy instruments. I 
do not attempt such here. It is worth noting, however, that a minimum wage is likely to 
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become less useful and attractive as the degree of union organization increases and the 
breadth and depth of a country‟s social welfare program expands, in part because these 
other instruments fill the social cost gap (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005). Going further, it 
is quite possible even in lightly regulated neo-liberal labor markets that a legislated 
minimum wage may be a second-best solution to the social cost problem, relative to one 
or more of the other approaches cited above. Institutionalists, therefore, take a pragmatic 
position on the minimum wage and are certainly willing to consider other options, per the 
observation of Commons that, “The problem is one, not of ideals, but alternatives” (1919: 
185), and the comment of his student John Fitch, “It is not legislation as such that we 
desire, but social advance” (1927, p. 243). The other side of the coin, however, is that 
institutionalists are also committed to the idea that the best policy should not be allowed 
to be the enemy of a good policy, implying a minimum wage – even if second-best – is 
likely better than doing nothing at all or waiting for a superior but politically unrealizable 
alternative.     
A second caveat concerns an equally practical but complex issue about a 
legislated minimum wage – how to set the value of the minimum wage so it 
approximately matches the social cost of labor. Labor maintenance and depreciation costs 
vary by a number of characteristics, such as occupation, industry, gender and 
demographic group, marital status, family size, and work status (part-time or full-time). 
One approach used earlier in the twentieth century in Australia, New Zealand, the UK 
and USA to help solve this problem was to establish some type of tripartite wage council, 
perhaps for individual industries, and give it responsibility for establishing a structure of 
minimum wages for individual groups. This approach was pushed by the institutionalists, 
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partly because it was seen as a good procedure for tailoring minimum wages to fit 
different groups‟ social wages and, partly, because it promoted greater industry 
democracy and worker voice (Kaufman, 2003). All of these countries, however, have 
moved closer to some type of uniform (“one size fits all”) national-level minimum wage. 
Obviously this shift entails benefits and costs; among the costs is much greater difficulty 
in setting a single minimum wage to fit multiple social wages (e.g., for a male single 
person household in a city versus a female head of household with three children in a 
rural area). Does this mean giving up on the minimum wage idea? Not on a priori 
grounds, but on pragmatic grounds as the workforce continues to diversify other policy 
instruments may become more effective at covering the social costs of labor.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
At the theory level the recent debate in Anglo-American countries about a legal minimum 
wage has largely centered on a “competitive” versus “monopsony” view of labor 
markets. So framed, the proponents of a minimum wage inevitably face an uphill battle 
since most economists are skeptical that substantively important monospony conditions 
pervade low-wage labor markets. I offer here an alternative positive rationale for 
minimum wage legislation. I wish I could claim it is my idea; the truth is that it goes back 
more than a century and finds it most eloquent and articulated exposition by LSE 
founders Sydney and Beatrice Webb in their classic work Industrial Democracy.  
Their argument is two-pronged: first, manual and unskilled workers in most 
situations of (truly) free market capitalism suffer from an inequality of bargaining power 
 30 
which leads to very low wages and working conditions and, second, that often these 
wages and working conditions do not cover the full social cost of labor. From a 
production perspective, the result is a misallocation of resources and economic 
inefficiency; from a distributional perspective the result is that labor subsidizes capital 
and consumers. So viewed, a legal minimum wage can improve economic efficiency and 
fairness by raising wage rates for low-paid workers to a level that covers the social cost 
of their contribution to production. 
Critics may respond that these ideas are interesting but also passé since they were 
developed a century ago in the age of dark satanic mills and laissez-faire capitalism, both 
of which have passed into history in the modern industrial countries. I view the matter in 
a different light. Without question, the modern welfare state and Keynesian demand 
management have considerably reduced labor‟s IBP, thus removing the most stark and 
egregious inequalities and inequities of capitalism. This warns us, however, to be 
skeptical about neo-liberal attempts to substantially gut the modern welfare state and 
return to a largely deregulated labor market, given that it was exactly this kind of 
economy that made a minimum wage and other such protective and stabilizing measures 
necessary. It is also the case that even today millions of workers in the industrial 
countries labor in jobs that do not pay a social wage. I particularly have in mind countries 
such as the United States where the legal minimum wage is quite low, collective 
bargaining covers less than eight percent of the private sector workforce, and other parts 
of the social safety net are often thin and porous. What we have, therefore, is the 
continued specter in the early twenty-first century of national governments and business 
firms shifting part of the social cost of labor on to workers, their families, and the society 
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at large. Accordingly, a minimum wage retains today a valid social mission as a device to 
promote both efficiency and equity in labor markets, albeit more prominently so in some 
countries than others. 
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